Shi'i Separatism in Iraq : Internet Reverie or Real Constitutional Challenge? by Visser, Reidar
No. 686 – 2005
Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk 
Institutt
Norwegian Institute 
of International 
Affairs
Reidar Visser
[686] Paper
Shi‘i Separatism in Iraq
Internet Reverie or Real Constitutional 
Challenge?
Utgiver: 
Copyright:
ISSN:
Besøksadresse:
Addresse:
Internett:
E-post:
Fax:
Tel:
NUPI
© Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2005
0800 - 0018
Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må 
ikke tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tilleg-
ges Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke 
reproduseres - helt eller delvis - ved trykking, fotokopi-
ering eller på annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne.
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambrosplass 2d
Postboks 8159 Dep. 
0033 Oslo 
www.nupi.no
pub@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
Reidar Visser
Shi‘i Separatism in Iraq
Internet Reverie or Real Constitutional 
Challenge?

 1
Abstract 
 
This paper deals with non-conformist ideas among Iraqi Shi‘is about the territorial 
integrity of the modern state of Iraq.  
     Two findings are presented. First, new Internet communications technology has 
enabled radical Shi‘is outside the main clerical, intellectual and political establish-
ments to propagate visions of an independent Shi‘i state for the areas south of Bagh-
dad, a scheme that runs counter to a robust and long-standing anti-separatist tradition 
among wider sections of the Shi‘i community. Secondly, by choosing the Internet as 
their primary modus operandi, the Shi‘i separatists also expose their relative weakness 
vis-à-vis other and less radical trends in Iraqi Shi‘i society. 
     In the Iraqi political process there is a need for a more realistic approach to what is 
seen as the “menace” of “Shi‘i separatism”. The evidence from the Internet suggests 
that, as of August 2005, advocates of outright secession are still peripheral to the Shi‘i 
community as a whole, and that there are fairly good prospects for the Shi‘is staying 
committed to the framework of a unified Iraq – albeit a decentralised and probably 
federalised one. At the same time, there are notable areas of rhetorical convergence 
between the Internet separatists and two more material (and to some extent mutually 
incompatible) political projects currently afoot in the Shi‘i community – a one-year 
old bid to establish a federal (non-sectarian) entity limited to the southernmost parts 
of the Shi‘i areas (Basra–Nasiriyya–‘Amara), and a more recent scheme to create a 
larger and specifically Shi‘i canton covering all Shi‘i territory south of Baghdad. 
Should the constitutional process fail to reconcile these projects with each other and 
with other competing Shi‘i and broader Iraqi currents, the scenario of spillover effects 
from the more radical separatist project cannot be excluded. Especially pertinent in 
this regard are recent constitutional proposals to eliminate the ceiling on the number 
of existing provinces allowed to amalgamate into federal entities – a move that would 
facilitate territorial expressions of sectarianism in Iraqi politics instead of checking 
them. 
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Introduction1 
 
Until recently, the idea of establishing a separate Shi‘i state in the Shi‘i core areas of 
Iraq south of Baghdad attracted more attention from outsiders than from the Iraqi 
Shi‘is themselves. Throughout the twentieth century, any challenge to the territorial 
unity of Iraq was considered taboo among Iraqi Shi‘is both at home and in exile – an 
attitude that persisted well beyond the 2003 Iraq War. Even in more recent proposals 
for a federal entity that would embrace the southernmost Shi‘i areas around Basra, 
there is explicit adherence to the principle of a territorially unified Iraq. 
  This paper shows how the Internet has facilitated the articulation of alternative Shi‘i 
views that challenge the orthodox view of Iraq’s current territorial make-up as some-
thing sacrosanct. In a setting where a strong tradition of Iraqi nationalism and a hier-
archical conservative Shi‘i clergy long have counteracted any non-conformist initia-
tives among Shi‘i intellectuals, the Internet today offers avenues where freewheeling 
ideas about the Iraq state and the Shi‘is can find expression. By using this new means 
of communication, young Shi‘is have successfully circumvented the barriers and cen-
sorship associated with traditional media (be it from peers or self-imposed), and have 
been able to inject radical proposals into the debate over post-war Iraqi politics, 
launching unconventional schemes for a separate Shi‘i homeland in an area described 
as their historical “core territory”. The new schemes are accompanied by fresh inter-
pretations of the history of the Shi‘i community and its ethnic origins, and by reas-
sessments of Iraqi history more generally and of the other major ethno-religious 
groups in the country. 
      Separatist ideas of this kind are an affront to traditional Shi‘i political discourse, 
where commitment to the idea of a unitary state has long been the norm. And the cy-
berspace separatists clearly remain a tiny faction within the Shi‘i community as a 
whole, with obvious difficulties in finding receptive audiences for their untrammelled 
Internet penmanship.  But the World Wide Web does provide them with unprece-
dented possibilities for disseminating renegade points of view – ideas that would oth-
erwise have ricocheted off the sturdy walls of communitarian traditionalism, with 
scant impact beyond local face-to-face communities. In this way, computer technol-
ogy opens up for potential political synergies that were inconceivable in the pre-
Internet age. At the same time, the Internet allows for an appreciation of the relatively 
marginal position of the separatist current as of today, and for a more realistic and so-
ber approach to the spectre of  “Shi‘i separatism”. In analyses of Iraqi politics, the 
scenario of the Shi‘is parting ways with areas north of Baghdad has become a conten-
tious factor, but one on which there is an urgent need for more empiricism:  if pre-
liminary findings from the Internet are correlated with information about Shi‘i trends 
in practical politics, the prospect of the Shi‘is holding on to the vision of a single state 
still seems an eminently credible scenario – that is, as long as their various demands 
for reform of the Iraqi system of government can be squared with each other and are 
taken seriously by key non-Shi‘i players. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 All Internet hyperlinks quoted were operational as of 1 August 2005 unless specifically noted other-
wise. 
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The anti-separatist tradition among Iraq’s Shi‘is 
 
The only substantial separatist project south of Baghdad in the twentieth century had 
little to do with the Shi‘is of the area. In the 1920s, the commercial elite of Basra 
launched a scheme to create a separate mercantile republic under British protection in 
a small enclave proximate to the Gulf coastline – with the area’s lush date gardens 
envisioned as the future economic basis for what could become a Singapore-like trad-
ing entrepôt on a stretch of territory vital to the British Empire. The project, which 
ultimately failed, was led by merchants and landowners mainly of Sunni and non-
Muslim origins. Only a few Shi‘is from Basra’s affluent Persian minority were in-
volved, whereas the large Arab Shi‘i majority in the region was sidelined by the po-
litical elites behind the separatist bid.2 
     By way of contrast, most Shi‘i leaders who in 1921 found themselves in a new po-
litical entity named the Kingdom of Iraq conformed to the territorial framework of 
that state with remarkable speed and pliancy. Their various revolts during the twenti-
eth century were all directed against the regimes in power in Baghdad rather than 
against the territorial composition of the Iraq state as such – a phenomenon detectable 
in Shi‘i rhetoric all the way from the 1920 anti-British uprising to the post–Gulf War 
uprising in 1991.  Many Shi‘is remained loyal to the paradigm of a unitary state even 
when proposals for decentralisation through a federative state model were launched at 
the time of the 2003 Iraq War, although increased sectarian violence from 2004 on-
wards led some Shi‘i political parties to question the wisdom of this approach.3 Still, 
even the most radical Shi‘i rethinking of Iraq’s territorial configuration sparked off by 
the post-2003 spate of terror attacks and suicide bombings – a scheme to create a 
separate federal region in the extreme south of Iraq, roughly in the Basra–Nasiriyya–
‘Amara triangle – was launched within the framework of a territorially unified Iraq. 
Although the scheme for a “Region of the South” was radical inasmuch as it de-
manded local control of a portion of oil revenues, there was no abandonment of the 
overall Iraq framework and explicit rejection of any plans for partition.4  
     At least three key factors have been instrumental in sustaining this anti-separatist 
tradition among the Shi‘is of Iraq. The first is the longevity of the geographical con-
cept of “Iraq” among the Shi‘is. While it is true that the finishing touches on the pre-
cise territorial structuring of the modern state of Iraq were done by British hands after 
the First World War, what is often overlooked is the omnipresence in Shi‘i literature 
from before 1914 about some kind of “Iraq” region – usually an entity more modestly 
sized than the contemporary state but an “Iraq” nonetheless.5 After the 1920s this 
                                                 
2
 T his separatist movement and its repercussions are covered in Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf 
State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2005). 
3
 On changing Shi‘i attitudes to a federal state model for Iraq, see ‘Adil Ra’uf, Al-‘amal al-islami fi al-
‘iraq bayna al-marja‘iyya wa-al-hizbiyya: qira’a naqdiyya li-masirat nisf qarn 1950–2000 [Islamic 
endeavours in Iraq between religious leadership and party politics: a critical reading of the experiences 
of a half-century, 1950–2000] (Damascus: Al-Markaz al-‘Iraqi li-al-I‘lam wa-al-Dirasat, 2000), pp. 
327–329; and Reidar Visser, “Shi‘i Perspectives on a Federal Iraq: Territory, Community and Ideology 
in Conceptions of a New Polity”, in Daniel Heradstveit & Helge Hveem (eds.), Oil in the Gulf: Obsta-
cles to Democracy and Development (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). An overview of post-war develop-
ments among Shi‘i Islamist parties in Iraq is provided by Juan Cole in “The United States and Shi‘ite 
Religious Factions in Postwar Iraq”, Middle East Journal, vol. 57 no. 4 (2003). 
4
 This is a contrast to the Kurds, who have been deliberately flirting with the idea of secession. 
5
 See Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State, pp. 48–49 and also pp. 102–103, and, on the controversy 
about the historical roots of “Iraq” as an identity category more generally, Hala Fattah, “The Question 
of the ‘Artificiality’ of Iraq as a Nation-State”, in Shams C. Inati (ed.), Iraq: Its History, People, and 
Politics (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003). 
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combined with the centralising efforts of a new generation of civil servants and bu-
reaucrats in the new state ruled by Faysal I to make for a second important centripetal 
driver: Iraqi nationalism. Propagated through the educational apparatus and the media 
(Iraq soon became one of the most prolific intellectual scenes in the Middle East), the 
idea of a centralised unitary state with Baghdad as its undisputed capital spread to the 
broad masses of Shi‘is well ahead of the 1958 collapse of the monarchy and the sub-
sequent onset of a more violent era in Iraqi politics. And finally, certain features of 
Shi‘ism itself have facilitated Shi‘i acceptance of the vision of territorial contiguity 
from the Gulf to the Kurdish mountains. In the first place, many Shi‘i clerics remain 
sceptical to association with any temporal state structures whatsoever in what they 
consider a power vacuum caused by the absence of the Twelfth Imam (believed to 
have receded into a state of occultation in AD 874) – an attitude that has favoured es-
tablished state models because it discourages political involvement in general.6 And 
also the second and more politicised current among Iraqi Shi‘is which became wide-
spread in the time of Ayatollah Khomeini has to a large extent maintained an Iraqi 
specificity – its several intellectual links to Iranian circles notwithstanding. The extent 
to which Iraqi nationalism has exercised an influence on Shi‘i Islamists has been evi-
dent for instance in the way many have objected to any tendencies of Iranian med-
dling in “Iraqi Shi‘i affairs”, as well as in the near-perfect respect for Iraq’s territorial 
integrity observed by Shi‘i opposition groups in exile in Iran during the war between 
the two neighbours in the 1980s – a period of exceptional domestic political pressures 
where any separatist (or Iranian irredentist) urges could be expected to be pushed to a 
maximum.7 Instead, a distinctive Iraqi Shi‘i Islamist tradition has developed where 
the idea of coexistence with Sunnis in a unified single state has achieved axiomatic 
status, with separatist ideas of a breakaway state remaining outside mainstream Shi‘i 
political thought. 
 
 
The Committee for the Independence of the Shi‘is of Iraq (CISI) website 
 
Around June 2004 there appeared on the Internet a website with the rebellious name 
Lajnat Istiqlal Shi‘at al-‘Iraq, which in English translates as the Committee for the 
Independence of the Shi‘is of Iraq (hereafter CISI). The site operated from a server 
belonging to a polytechnic in the Finnish city of Turku/Åbo, and at first existed only 
as a subdirectory to the personal homepage of an Iraqi from the Middle Euphrates 
area who studied at the school. (In early 2005 the website relocated to a separate do-
main and at the same time most of the articles from 2004 quoted below were re-
moved, but this apparently had to do with space problems rather than any change of 
                                                 
6
 This aspect is outlined in Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1985), pp. 189–199. 
7
 If anything, the main competitor to Iraqi nationalism among Shi‘is has been pan-Islamic universalism 
more generally rather than any wish for closer bilateral integration with Iran, a prospect many devoted 
Iraqi Shi‘i Islamists still scoff at and contemptuously dismiss as a scheme for making Iraq an “Iranian 
garden” (hadiqa iraniyya). Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), is instructive with regard to the Iraqi Shi‘is’ assertion of an “Arab” as opposed to a “Persian” 
identity; on the forging of exiled opposition groups with specifically Iraqi orientations during the 
1980s, see Faleh A. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi, 2003) pp. 236–238, and p. 267 
on Iraqi Islamist attitudes to the idea of union with Iran.  
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editorial policy – a few representative articles from the first incarnation of the site 
were also re-published.)8 
     Beyond the unorthodox choice of name for the website, the contents of the materi-
als published by CISI are remarkable for several reasons. First, here is an astonishing 
succession of provocative article headlines. The public is invited to read about such 
seditious topics as “Dialogue on Shi‘i Independence”, “Yes to Separatism, O Shi‘is of 
Iraq!” and “When Will the Declaration of the Democratic Shi‘i Republic of Southern 
Iraq Take Place?”9 One article promises to elaborate on the “characteristics of the sys-
tem of government” in the “state of the Shi‘is of Iraq”.10 There are calls for “demon-
strations” in support of Shi‘i independence (portrayed as a suitable emulation of 
Kurdish pro-separation activists)11 and one writer even depicts Shi‘i independence as 
the best alternative to a plot described as the “Arab League conspiracy”.12 
     Highly inflammatory matter hides behind these headlines, as can be seen in the 
justifications offered for the radical separatist agenda.  Certain writers concentrate on 
pragmatic and utilitarian arguments in support of separation, the line of reasoning be-
ing that the Sunnis have burned all bridges and are prepared to destroy Iraq in pursuit 
of their political objectives (they are variously portrayed as the “Taliban of Falluja”, 
promoters of “Arab chauvinism”, exponents of “Umayyad hatred” and even  “Salafi-
Ba‘thists”)13 – so why should the Shi‘is stoically uphold nationalist ideals any 
longer?14 The initial contributions from the summer of 2004 also contain many refer-
                                                 
8
 Two CISI declarations of aims were issued, both titled “Da‘wa li-tashkil lajnat istiqlal shi‘at al-‘iraq” 
[Call for the formation of the Committee for the Independence of the Shi‘is of Iraq] 
(www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHI3AT2/September/firstcall.htm and www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... 
/SHI3AT2/September/secondcall), accessed on 16 December 2004, removed in early 2005. The new 
CISI site is at http://www.shi3at.com/. 
9
 Talib al-Shatri, “Hiwar fi al-istiqlal al-shi‘i” (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/alshatri1.htm); 
Haqqi Isma‘il, “Na’m li-al-istiqlal ya shia‘at al-‘iraq”, (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... 
/SHE3AT/ismail1.htm); Karam al-Khazraji, “Mata yatimmu i‘lan jumhuriyyat janub al-‘iraq al-
shi‘iyya al-dimuqratiyya?”, 3 October 2004, (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... 
/SHI3AT2/October/Karam1.htm). All links now defunct, last accessed on 16 December 2004.  
10
 Muhammad Hasan al-Musawi, “Ma‘alim al-nizam al-siyasi li-dawlat shi‘at al-‘iraq”, 
(www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/almusawi2.htm), accessed on 16 December 2004, now de-
funct. 
11
 As‘ad Rashid, “Tazahura kurdiyya li-al-infisal … wa-al-matlub ‘tazahura shi‘iyya’ li-al-istiqlal” 
[Kurdish demonstration in favour of separation … what is called for is a “Shi‘i demonstration” for in-
dependence] (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHI3AT2/October/rashid1.htm), accessed on 16 Decem-
ber 2004, now defunct. 
12
 Hasan al-Zamili, “Aqwa silah bi-yadd al-shi‘a al-yawm i‘lan istiqlalihim qabla tanfidh mu’amarat al-
jami‘a al-‘arabiyya” [The most powerful weapon in the hands of the Shi‘is today is a declaration of 
their independence before the conspiracy of the Arab League is implemented] 
(www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHI3AT2/december/zamili1.htm), accessed on 16 December 2004, 
now defunct.  
13
 Even the morphology comes with an insurrectionary touch in this case: literally given as salafiba‘thi, 
this is a compound construction which in itself is unorthodox in Arabic. Taken from As‘ad Rashid, 
“Shi‘at al-‘iraq / la mafarr! Al-hukm al-dhati wa-al-istiqlal wa-imma al-dhabh wa-al-tathir al-ta’ifi” 
[Shi‘is of Iraq, there is no escape! Self-rule and independence or else bloodshed and sectarian clean-
sing] (http://www.shi3at.com/SHI3AT2/june/as3ad29.htm). Another term frequently used derogatively 
is qawmji, derived from the Arabic word for “[pan-Arab] nationalist” and with an added (originally 
Turkish) slang ending. 
14
 One exposition of such views is given by As‘ad Rashid, “Al-akrad yatmahuna ‘hissat al-asad’ wa-al-
sunna daminu al-mustaqbal … wa-al-shi‘a la-khiyar lahum illa kiyanahum al-khass” [The Kurds are 
eyeing the lion’s share, the Sunnis have “guaranteed” the future … And for the Shi‘is there is no option 
left but a separate state entity] (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/rashid2.htm), accessed on 16 
December 2004, now defunct. Some of these contributions are also coloured by the controversy about 
the United Nations envoy to Iraq at the time, Lakhdar Brahimi, and his alleged anti-Shi‘i bias. 
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ences to the increased sectarian violence seen in Iraq during the preceding spring, and 
the murder of Basra politician ‘Izz al-Din Salim is singled out as a particularly raw 
sectarian attack on the Shi‘is as a collective group that might legitimise a complete 
revision of the political options open to the community. One question recurs: why 
should the Shi‘is adhere to the ideal of a unified nation when the country has already 
become de facto divided through a mayhem of political violence? The blame for this 
situation is placed squarely with the Sunnis, with the underlying implication that the 
ideal of Iraqi unity may in itself be commendable, but that post-war developments 
have damaged it beyond repair: 
 
Contemplations of a Shi‘i state hold the Sunnis responsible for dividing Iraq. 
The Sunnis have persisted in the same kind of behaviour and have failed to rec-
ognise their historical errors, including their alliance with the pan-Arab 
nationalists (qawmiyyin) and their suppression of the local–territorial [i.e. 
“Iraqi”] nationalist (al-watani) in favour of the sectarian (al-madhabi). They 
have pursued Machiavellian tricks in order to win political control – first by 
allying themselves with the occupier at the time of “the first state” [i.e. the Brit-
ish-sponsored monarchy, 1921–1958], later by adopting two-tongued discourse 
as regards the US occupation of Iraq, branding those who interact with the 
occupiers as traitors in case they are not Sunnis but claiming heroic and 
legendary nationalist status for Sunnis who themselves have dealings with the 
occupiers. Finally, they have tried to ignite infighting among the Iraqis as well 
as [internal] Shi‘i-Shi‘i conflict.15 
 
Some articles detail pessimistic scenarios of how preservation of the one-state model 
would mean continued Sunni domination in new Islamised apparel: 
 
The division of Iraq into three statelets dates back to the aftermath of the an-
nexation of Kuwait and the subsequent imposition of two no-fly-zones – the 
Shi‘is did not object, the Kurds welcomed them, and the Sunnis remained silent. 
As for today, Kurdistan already possesses the shape and the institutions of an 
independent state, whereas the Sunnis intend to set up an Islamic caliphate state 
with its centre in al-Anbar, and then to subjugate the rest of the regions to their 
rule with the exception of Kurdistan.16 
 
But whilst these passages are directed against specific variants of Sunni minority rule 
(secular Ba‘thist, religious “Salafi” or “Wahhabi”), others convey a more fundamental 
distrust of Sunnism and a complete lack of confidence in Sunni ability to adopt more 
conciliatory policies: 
 
The Arabs have accepted the realities of the situation in Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait 
and Bahrain and Tunisia, as well as in Darfur and Kurdistan, but they will fight 
with gritted teeth against a well-developed, rich, strong and independent Shi‘i 
state because the cultural foundation for the Arab state is a Sunni foundation; in 
a Shi‘i individual they see nothing but a rejectionist [of the Sunni caliphate, 
                                                 
15
 Translated from Talib al-Shatri, “Ru’ya hawla al-dawla al-shi‘iyya” [Opinion on the Shi‘i state] 
(www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/alshatri5.htm), accessed on 16 December 2004, now defunct. 
16
 Translated from Talib al-Shatri, “Al-shi‘a wa-al-dawla al-mustaqilla … Ishkaliyat al-mustalah” [The 
Shi‘is and the independent state: complexities of the concept] (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... 
/SHE3AT/alshatri2.htm), accessed on 16 December 2004, now defunct. 
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rafidi] whose murder is more justified than the killing of an unbeliever. If the 
Shi‘i majority in Bahrain had been in a position to run the Bahraini state they 
would have been accused of threatening Arab unity.17 
  
     Other writers elaborate such ideas about unbridgeable sectarian antagonisms, in 
various ways making the case for recognition of the Shi‘is as a candidate for separate 
nationhood. Jawad al-Sa‘idi employs historical analogy, referring to the existence of 
Shi‘i breakaway states in medieval times (Hamdanid rule in areas of present-day 
northern Syria and Fatimid rule in Egypt are given as examples) and enquiring why 
the concept of a separate Shi‘i state tailored on the basis of a “Lesser Iraq” template 
should be branded as harmful and offensive.18 Several contributors buttress their rea-
soning by summoning up images of an Iraq with historical tension between the uncul-
tivated “desert” with its (Sunni) “Wahhabi” Bedouins, and the “settled” civilised and 
riverine cultures (associated with the Shi‘is by many writers – actually in disregard of 
the nomadic origins of many recently converted Shi‘i tribes).19 And Muhammad 
Hasan al-Musawi takes the historical dimension full circle: anthropological studies, he 
asserts, prove that the current Shi‘i population of Iraq are the “natural extension” of 
the great (pre-Islamic) Babylonian and Sumerian20 civilisations; he then proceeds to 
discuss “self-determination” for the Shi‘is and their status as a potential member of 
the United Nations.21A similar theme is pursued by Basim al-‘Awwadi, who main-
tains that the Shi‘is form a separate “nation” (jins, a word with heavy connotations of 
discrete divisions also used for “species” and “biological gender”), and goes on to put 
the sufferings of the Shi‘is during decades of Ba‘th rule in comparative perspective by 
drawing attention to “the Christians” of East Timor. That group, he observes, has 
achieved international recognition as a separate nation – should not the Shi‘is, who 
have endured hardship ten times worse, entertain similar ambitions?22  Some of these 
ideas are nothing less than a complete overturning of the traditional Shi‘i position on 
the question of ethnicity: eager to shrug off any accusations of collusion with Iran, 
Shi‘i intellectuals have historically been at pains to surpass the ruling (Sunni-
dominated) regimes in Baghdad in terms of stressing their own “Arabness”, with an-
gry strictures on any hint of separate ethnic origins.23 
                                                 
17
 Translated from al-Shatri, “Ru’ya …” 
18
 Jawad al-Sa‘id, “Al-dawla al-shi‘iyya al-mustaqilla durura mulihha” [An independent Shi‘i state is 
an urgent necessity] (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/jwad1.htm), accessed on 16 December 
2004, now defunct. 
19
 See for instance the description of Ramadi in As‘ad Rashid, “ ‘Al-muqawama al-ahwaziyya’ wa-‘al-
muqawama al-‘iraqiyya’ wajhan li-‘umla wahida [The “resistance of Ahwaz” and the “Iraqi resis-
tance”: two faces of the same coin] (http://www.shi3at.com/SHI3AT2/june/as3ad22.htm). 
20
 The Ba‘thist political elites strove hard to monopolise Iraq’s pre-Islamic past and to put it into a 
framework suitable to their own vision of Iraqi specificity within a larger secular and pan-Arab order. 
But some texts by Iraqi academics that dwell on non-Arab influences in ancient Mesopotamian history 
were in fact published by the regime as late as in the 1980s without much censorial intervention; see 
the discussion in Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern 
Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) pp. 223–224.  
21
 Muhammad Hasan al-Musawi, “Ma‘alim al-nizam al-siyasi … ” 
22
 Basim al-‘Awwadi, “Al-‘iraq al-shi‘i huwa al-‘iraq al-tarikhi wa-hatimat al-istiqlal” [Shi‘i Iraq is the 
“historical Iraq” and the determinant for independence] (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... 
/SHE3AT/awadi1.htm), accessed on 16 December 2004, now defunct. 
23
 Thankfully so, some might perhaps wish to add, although certain Shi‘i writings about their own 
Arabness – at times rather uncritically paraphrased by Western analysts determined to avoid the old 
fallacy of equating Shi‘ism with Iran – verge on sheer racism.  They are also at odds with centuries-
long traditions of peaceful Arab–Persian coexistence on the popular level in shared border zones – ar-
eas  that became effectively bisected only when centralising state powers emerged in Baghdad and Te-
 8
     What territory is supposed to be “liberated”? On this, most contributors converge. 
The maximalist demand is the area of Iraq bounded by Samarra’ (on the Tigris north 
of Baghdad) and the Gulf (Fao and Umm Qasr, Iraq’s deep-water port, are the usual 
symbolic points of reference for the southern frontier).24 Samarra’, where the Twelfth 
Imam disappeared, is considered one of the four holy cities of the Shi‘is of Iraq, but 
Shi‘is today are in the minority north of Baghdad. And so some writers stake out a 
more modest dominion that would involve a Shi‘i state stretching from Baghdad 
(some even propose subdividing the capital city with a Shi‘i zone with its nucleus in 
Karkh on the west bank of the Tigris, and a Sunni centre based on Rasafa on the op-
posite side of the river) and south to the head of the Gulf. To many writers this is sim-
ply the territory where Shi‘is are concentrated. Others, however, expand on the theme, 
drawing up lines in history that lend to the “Shi‘i areas” a centuries-long specificity. 
This land, argues Basim al-‘Awwadi,25 is “the historical Iraq” (al-‘iraq al-tarikhi), 
where the “revolution” against the British in 1920 was allegedly concentrated (com-
peting sources emphasise Sunni participation in areas north of Baghdad as well as 
Shi‘i abstentions in the extreme south),26 and this is where Shi‘ism was founded – 
long before Baghdad had even been built and many centuries ahead of the emergence 
of the “modern state of Iraq”, which in this perspective is reduced to a soulless con-
trasting category. Yet another writer heretically dismisses the modern Iraqi state as 
the creation of the Sykes–Picot agreement between Britain and France dating back 
only to the First World War27 (constructivist interpretations kindred to this one are 
popular with Western historians but traditionally have been anathema to Iraqi nation-
alists), whereas Talib al-Shatri explicitly juxtaposes the idea of a smaller Shi‘i Iraq to 
the cliché Iraqi nationalist slogan of “national unity from Zakho [on the Turkish bor-
der] to Fao [the southern tip of Iraq at the Gulf]”.28 On a few occasions, the propo-
nents of this alternative conception of Iraq even go as far as to introduce new nomen-
clature, for instance by employing appellations like “al-Sawad” (the name of the clas-
sical Islamic province that roughly corresponded to the parts of modern-day Iraq lying 
south of Samarra’).29 But one thing these subversive writers cannot quite seem to lib-
erate themselves from is the concept of Iraq as such. The solution chosen with a re-
definition as “the historical Iraq” only serves to emphasise how deeply ingrained this 
geographical concept has become at all levels of Shi‘i political discourse. 
     If the CISI rhetoric is brimful of radicalism, it is equally laden with a sense of sub-
jugation and marginalisation within the community that the writers seek to represent. 
They repeatedly bemoan “the Shi‘i leadership”, both “religious” and “political”, of 
                                                                                                                                            
hran in the twentieth century. For the more orthodox, pro-Arab position articulated by a writer who 
does indeed favour substantial decentralisation, see ‘Ali Al Shaffaf, “Dirasa tarikhiyya (murtajala) 
hawla asl al-‘arab” [(Improvised) historical study on the origins of the Arabs], 26 December 2004 
(http://www.iraqsawad.net/a4044.htm). 
24
 Haqqi Isma‘il, “Muqawamat al-dawla al-shi‘iyya fi al-‘iraq” [Struggles for a Shi‘i state in Iraq] 
(www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/ismail2.htm), accessed on 16 December 2004, now defunct. 
25
 Al-‘Awwadi, “Al-‘iraq al-shi‘i …”  
26
 See for instance Philip Willard Ireland, ‘Iraq: A Study in Political Development (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1937), pp. 270–271.  
27
 Muhammad Sa‘id al-Khatib, “Al-sayyid husayn hadi al-sadr wa-iqlim-al-janub” [Sayyid Husayn al-
Sadr and the Region of the South] (http://www.shi3at.com/SHI3AT2/march/khatib1.htm). 
28
 Al-Shatri, “Hiwar fi al-istiqlal …” 
29
 On the other hand, the use of such terms as, the “Land of the Two Great Rivers” (bilad al-rafidayn), 
an Arabic equivalent of “Mesopotamia”, reflects more standard synonym usage without such obvious 
connotations of dissidence – incidentally, this term is frequently employed by al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, whose 
sympathisers in Saudi Arabia achieve a far more dramatic effect in their areas of operation by consis-
tently referring to “the Arabian Peninsula” instead of the name of the monarchy. 
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which they clearly do not see themselves as members.30 They despair of the lack of 
Shi‘i political initiative in the direction they personally favour: whereas the Kurds ac-
tually have demonstrations in support of independence, CISI writers can only write 
about such mass events in terms of wishful thinking. And they vent their frustration 
about the lack of interest in the project of a Shi‘i (breakaway) state when it comes to 
the intellectuals of Najaf, the centre of learning for Iraqi Shi‘is, seeing this lacuna 
(da‘f fiqh al-dawla ‘anda madrasat najaf, literally “the weakness of comprehension 
and jurisprudence as regards ‘the state’ in the Najaf school of thought”) as a chief fac-
tor preventing the realisation of their political ambitions.31 Indeed, the writers frankly 
admit that the first contributions to a corpus of separatist Shi‘i writings appeared only 
“a few months ago”,32 and they sideline a good deal of the Shi‘i establishment as they 
vent their anger: 
 
What is clear is that the Shi‘i political leaders, political and religious alike, re-
main timid when it comes to raising their voices for the Shi‘is and asking for 
their rights, and that they do not have enough courage to introduce a strong Shi‘i 
project (which would build for the Shi‘is their own entity (kiyan) and defend 
their existence) or to take the initiative in what is referred to as “the new Iraq”. 
This abandonment of Shi‘i rights was perfectly clear from the signing of the 
Transitional (in secret: the Permanent) Administrative Law and until the forma-
tion of the new “Ba‘thist” [i.e. meaning the ‘Allawi!] government. Moreover, 
these leaders are patting the culture of “spurious national unity”, the “unity of 
the Iraqi territory”, and false “religious unity” and “there are no differences be-
tween Shi‘is and Sunnis” – all of which is idle talk.33 
 
     The identities of the authors represented on the site underscore the image of a sub-
altern, bottom–up political project. In addition to the first web host, an Iraqi emigrant 
based in Finland, four of the most frequent contributors are also Iraqis in exile – two 
in the United Kingdom, one in Sweden and one in Finland. Others claim to be writing 
from Iraq but prefer to use what appear to be noms de guerre instead of their own 
names. Symptomatically, the genesis of the CISI network itself seems to have been 
partially Internet-driven, for it is possible to trace scattered pro-separation postings on 
a Syrian opposition website back to as early as February 2004, when a London-based 
intellectual responded to a pioneering article on the subject written by Talib al-
Shatri.34 Both men went on to figure prominently as CISI contributors. Still, it is not a 
                                                 
30
 One example is the anonymous article by “independent Islamist”, “Al-mukhabarat al-‘iraqiyya tunaf-
fidhu mukhattatan rahiban tahtu ri‘ayat al-marja‘iyya al-sunniyya ‘hay’at ‘ulama’ al-mukhtatifin’” 
[The Iraqi intelligence services carry out a dreadful scheme under the auspices of the Sunni religious 
leadership, “the association of the scholars of the hostage-takers” (a jeu de mots that makes fun of the 
board’s official designation, the Association of Muslim Scholars, hay’at ‘ulama’ al-muslimin, by sub-
stituting “hostage-takers” for “Muslims”.)] (www.dc.turkuamk.fi/Users/ ... /SHE3AT/mustaqil5.htm), 
accessed on 16 December 2004, now defunct. 
31
 Al-Shatri, “Hiwar fi al-istiqlal …”  
32
 Al-Shatri, “Ru’ya …”  
33
 Translated from al-Sa‘id, “Al-dawla al-shi‘iyya …” 
34
 Basim al-‘Awwadi, “Muqawamat al-‘iraq al-shi‘i al-mustaqill min samarra’ ila al-faw” [The strug-
gles for an independent Shi‘i Iraq from Samarra’ to Fao], 24 February 2004 
(http://www.syriamirror.net/modules/news/print.php?storyid=798). See also Talib al-Shatri, “Li-kay la 
nazalla nahruthu fi al-hawr” [In order that we shall not remain tilling in the marshlands], 7 February 
2004 (http://www.syriamirror.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=641) and “Al-akrad yastaqilluna 
wa-al-sunna yatasallatuna wa-al-shi‘a yatahamaquna”[The Kurds liberate themselves, the Sunnis take 
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completely underground project: some CISI participants have appeared on Arabic sat-
ellite-television talk shows (albeit in less controversial contexts or with less radical 
agendas); at least one is understood to have links to more mainstream Shi‘i political 
parties in Iraq; yet another writes under his full name from Baghdad, where he says he 
works in the Internet and telecom sector. 
     Reflecting its fringe character, the website can offer only fragmented, ad hoc ideas 
about the principles intended to underpin the projected new Shi‘i state. Some con-
tributors speak of a “secular, non-religious system” (nizam ‘almani la-dini), others 
refer to a “humanistic” state (dawlat al-insan), and all readily make general references 
to the oil resources seen to belong to the “Shi‘i state” and expected to constitute its 
future keystone.35 On the other hand, there is conspicuous (but, given the secularist 
tendencies, quite unsurprising) silence with respect to the main model for establishing 
a Shi‘i state that is indeed available – Khomeini’s ideas about the rule of the jurispru-
dent (wilayat al-faqih) – and it is quite typical of the website that almost the entire 
leading Shi‘i clergy and their scholarship are ignored, with the writers quoting Francis 
Fukuyama rather than Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim or Kazim al-Ha’iri (from the more 
quietist Iraq-based clergy, fewer titles on “the state” and its politics are obtainable at 
all), and referring to Italy’s Lega Nord instead of separatist precedents within the 
Muslim world. And so whilst the CISI website represents a bold challenge to the es-
tablished religious leadership – a move that in itself has interesting parallels to the 
ways in which Sunni activists earlier and more successfully have challenged their own 
(much less stratified) clerical establishment – the sense of marginality of the separatist 
project continues to pervade the writings presented. The notion of isolation holds true 
in the greater regional and international context as well: the idea of outside sponsor-
ship is shunned by many, and some writers are fiercely anti-American or anti-Iranian, 
or indeed both at the same time.36 
 
 
Separatist agitation on other websites 
 
The strategy chosen by the CISI – that of establishing exclusive web space wholly 
devoted to a particular strain of political thought – offers maximum editorial control 
but also demands considerable efforts in establishing the necessary infrastructure. 
Other solutions are less exacting but at the same time more risky, as shown by Shi‘i 
separatist postings to other websites with different agendas.  
     One example of this occurred in May and June 2005 when proponents of setting up 
some sort of independent Shi‘i entity had several articles published on the website of 
an organisation with less radical political aims – the Federalist Association for the 
Region of the South (al-tajammu‘ al-fidirali li-iqlim al-janub, henceforth FARS). 
FARS has as its stated objective to work for a federal region in the three southern 
governorates of Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar, “in accordance with the Iraqi Transi-
tional Administrative Law, and within the framework of a unified Iraq” – and as such 
                                                                                                                                            
over control and the Shi‘is pretend they are stupid], 12 April 2004 
(http://www.souria.com/club/sb_read.asp?id=31535). 
35
 See for instance Muhammad Hasan al-Musawi, “Ma‘alim al-nizam al-siyasi …” For a piece with 
more religious undertones by a CISI writer, see Talib al-Shatri’s “A‘ajib al-shi‘a … ghadab li sab‘a wa-
nisyan al-milayin” [Strangeness of the Shi‘is … fury for seven and forgetfulness for millions], 16 June 
2004 (thenewiraq.com/i/news_item.asp?NewsID=1300), accessed on 13 July 2005. 
36
 For an example of a causerie-style CISI view of the US role in southern Iraq, see Talib al-Shatri, 
“Al-jamus wa-al-bayzun” [The water buffalo and the bison], 22 August 2004 
(http://www.kitabat.com/r24006.htm), accessed on 13 July 2005, now unavailable. 
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represents a far broader southern regionalist trend with roots in real politics that has 
emerged since 2004.37 However, several of the pro-separation articles submitted to 
this website’s discussion group clearly violate the legalistic and non-sectarian ap-
proach of the host site. 
     A piece by Abu Jihad al-‘Iraqi illustrates this tendency.38 The general tone of the 
article is highly sectarian, condemnatory and essentialist vis-à-vis the Sunnis:  
 
Without further embellishment, with no retouche, unaccompanied by philoso-
phy or argument: surely the situation in Iraq will not stabilise except through the 
division of the country. The reason for this is well known. The Arab Sunni mi-
nority simply is unable to fully grasp the idea of power-sharing with others in 
the government of Iraq and the management of its natural wealth and resources 
– because the Sunnis are addicted to subjugating others, to stealing their riches 
and to underrating other people’s rights and sacred things. 
 
Apart from the decidedly separatist stance, this contribution also diverges from the 
mainstream pro-federal current with regard to geography: whereas the project of es-
tablishing a federal canton for the three southernmost governorates of Iraq is consis-
tently marketed by FARS as a non-sectarian project (profiled towards Shi‘is, Sunnis 
and non-Muslims of these three areas and with no particular attention to the vast ma-
jority of Iraqi Shi‘is living north of the zone), Abu Jihad al-‘Iraqi addresses “the 
Shi‘is” more generally and outlines a Shi‘i breakaway state that would extend all the 
way from Baghdad to the Gulf. The incongruity between the two visions is at its most 
delicate when it comes to the “wealth” and “resources” repeatedly alluded to in the 
posting, for it is common knowledge that the proven oil reserves of the extreme south 
by far surpass those of the other Shi‘i areas further north – where also any material 
efforts to build a federal subunits were lagging behind as of mid-2005. Moreover, it 
exposes the tension between different concepts of the “Iraqi south”. Westerners (and, 
increasingly, Iraqis in exile) often use the label “southern Iraq” for every inch of Iraqi 
territory downstream of the Baghdad–Falluja axis, for instance in expressions such as 
“the southern city of Najaf” (in fact, Najaf lies much closer to Baghdad than to the 
Gulf, but its description as “southern” has virtually acquired default status among 
many newswire services who on a daily basis reproduce this mental picture for a 
global audience). The population of the areas around Basra and its neighbouring gov-
ernorates, on the other hand, often reserve the term “southerner” for themselves – a 
distinction that involves an idea of a “Deep South” but one that gets conflated when 
“the south” is used as shorthand for “Shi‘i-inhabited areas” more generally. 
     On the other hand, creative synergies are also possible with this sort of Internet 
strategy, as seen in a contribution by a certain ‘Abd al-Karim al-Sa‘idi, identified as 
                                                 
37
 A very useful source for the emergence of the project for a federal entity in the south is the Basra 
local newspaper al-Manara, see for instance issues for 10 April 2005 p. 2; 24 April 2005 p. 2; 28–29 
June 2005 p. 4; 12–13 July 2005 p. 2. See also “Ahali al-basra fi istitla‘ ra’y …” [The people of Basra 
in opinion poll…], al-Mada, 16 October 2004. Some key features are summarised in Visser, Basra, the 
Failed Gulf State, pp. 171–176.  
38
 Abu Jihad al-‘Iraqi, “Shi‘at al-‘iraq … al-istiqlal aw al-mawt” [Shi‘is of Iraq … Independence or 
death], 29 June 2005 (http://www.southiraq.org/iraq/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=78). 
For a less radical but equally sectarian proposal for a specifically Shi‘i federal canton, see Ibn al-
Intifada, “Al-fidiraliyya al-shi‘iyya haqq tabi‘i yajibu an yusawwita ‘alayhi al-sha‘b”, [A Shi‘i federal 
entity is a natural right which the people should get to vote on], 10 June 2005 
(http://www.southiraq.org/iraq/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=48). (In current Arabic 
usage, “federalism” is increasingly used as a singular noun to denote “a federal entity”.) 
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an “Iraqi university teacher” but possibly writing under a pseudonym.39 In this article 
the (separatist) geographical scope apparently harmonises with that of the (federalist) 
host site, for the author makes comparisons of scale between his projected statelet and 
existing Arab states like Libya and Lebanon, claiming that the “southern” area singled 
out for separation has a population roughly on par with the former and a geographical 
extension comparable to the latter – thus consistent with a small-scale amalgamation 
of the three southernmost governorates only (a purely sectarian state extending all the 
way northwards to Baghdad, on the other hand, would have made for more impressive 
statistics). This might be a better recipe for getting FARS browsers to read the full 
article, and indeed in the early parts of the article there are hints of sentimentality vis-
à-vis Iraqi nationalism as a beau idéal – possibly a suitable umbrella for a cluster of 
small-scale statelets joined together in some sort of confederal arrangement? Thus, 
Sa‘idi castigates Nasser, recounting that the Egyptian leader 
 
… wanted to annex Iraq to construct a “nuclear union” with its sister Egypt in 
order to create an entity that would frighten the enemies of the Arab nation, ex-
cept that he ran into [literally, “choked on”] the keen nationalist ‘Abd al-Karim 
Qasim, who refused to become an instrument to any [country] but Iraq and [also 
refused to serve as] gunpowder for non-Iraqi guns.  
 
But what follows is again rather more radical than most other postings on the site. Be-
yond the common criticism of the disproportionate presence of individuals from the 
Upper Euphrates at the top level of the old regime (in a pun, the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research is rendered as the Ministry of ‘Ana Education and 
Rawa Research, referring to two towns in that area), there is a more general attack on 
“pan-Arab nationalists”, their project of a “renaissance state” (dawla nahdawiyya) and 
even their alleged “Arab nationalist imperialism” (isti‘mar qawmi ‘arabi). The author 
then goes on to pick up a theme already seen in CISI writings, by referring to the an-
cient Sumerians as the mythic ancestors of the population of the south. It seems clear 
that this is an attempt at radicalising the existing federalist project for the south – a 
project which has thus far enjoyed much more widespread popular support than the 
hardliners who wish to sever all ties to regions north of Baghdad. 
     Despite such fields of possible convergence, the image of separatists on the side-
lines is what characterises the FARS website. Traffic data published online show that 
only between 10 and 30 readers accessed the separatist articles during the first three 
months after their publication, the mutinous subject lines notwithstanding. More neu-
tral-sounding pieces like “Study on Federalism”40 achieved a readership four times 
this large. In fact, the only posting with any kind of obvious separatist content that 
was widely read was one whose headline specifically linked the idea of separation to 
the Marsh Arabs (who inhabit a limited area between Basra and ‘Amara and who per-
haps more than any other segment of the Shi‘i community suffered severely under the 
Ba‘th), again indicating that the project of establishing a large single state for all 
                                                 
39
 ‘Abd al-Karim al-Sa‘id , “Al-istiqlal wa-laysa al-fidiraliyya ya sayyid harun!!” [Independence not 
federalism, Sayyid Harun!!], 31 May 2005 
(http://www.southiraq.org/iraq/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=39). 
40
 ‘Ali al-Qutbi, “Bahth fi al-fidiraliyya”, 25 May 2005 
(http://www.southiraq.org/iraq/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=32). 
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Shi‘is from the south to the Iraqi capital faces continued dissent – disinterest even – 
from the very constituencies targeted by the separatists.41  
     On other Iraq websites, a sprinkling of separatist initiatives has similarly failed to 
occasion much excitement. Articles that appeared on the CISI and FARS sites have 
been cross-posted to such electronic journals as alrafidayn.com, www.kitabat.com, 
www.sotaliraq.com and www.alhalem.net, but there is not much trace of follow-up 
activities, whether on the Internet or in practical politics, resulting from these ef-
forts.42 Recent scattered Arab nationalist condemnations of alleged Shi‘i separatist 
tendencies still seem to be informed mostly by traditional stereotypes of their oppo-
nents (like the Shi‘is as fifth columnists for Iran),43 and only a few isolated writers 
make any reference to the specifics of the Internet Shi‘i pro-separation radicals.44 In 
sum, by the time the constitutional drafting process began to intensify in August 2005, 
Shi‘i separatists remained peripheral to the Iraqi political process in most areas out-
side the home turf created by themselves on the World Wide Web. 
     There is, however, one field where Shi‘i separatists and federalists on the Internet 
are pulling in the same direction – although on a subject not directly linked to the 
main question of political strategy. Ever since the 1960s, Arab nationalists of Sunni 
origins have employed varying smear tactics to taint the Shi‘is and brand them as pro-
Iranian collaborators. Prominent among these manoeuvres has been the use of the la-
bel shu‘ubiyya – originally connotative of a political trend which during Abbasid 
times resisted the idea of Arab supremacy within the Islamic state, but in recent dec-
ades exploited by the Ba‘th regime in a bizarre propaganda mix where ideas of “racial 
inferiority” resulting from alleged Persian and Indian connections have also been in-
gredients and where Shi‘is (Marsh Arabs in particular) have been singled out for at-
tack.45 Another such tag is shuruqi, ostensibly derived from the same Arabic conso-
                                                 
41
 Wahhab Razzaq al-Hindawi, “Na‘m li-jumhuriyyat al-ma‘dan al-dimuqratiyya” [Yes to the democ-
ratic republic of the Marsh Arabs], 23 May 2005 
(http://www.southiraq.org/iraq/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=30). 
42
 See for instance Hasan al-Zamili, “Matlab al-mustad‘afin istiqlal al-duwal [sic – the content of the 
article strongly suggests that it is the singular dawla which is intended] al-shi‘iyya al-badil ‘an tazwir 
al-intikhabat” [The demand of the oppressed is (an) independent Shi‘i state(s) instead of forged elec-
tions], undated, circa December 2004, (http://www.alhalem.net/New13/talaabmostadafeen.htm). 
43
  ‘Adnan Husayn, “Dawlat janub al-‘iraq ..!” [The state of Southern Iraq ..!], al-Sharq al-Awsat (2 
July 2005). See also the more standard criticism against any subdivision of Iraq and the fear of ethnic 
domino effects” in Mahdi Qasim, “Yaqulu al-‘iraq: ‘hatta anta ya brutus’ ” [Iraq says, “et tu Brute”], 
12 October 2004 (http://www.kitabat.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=892), accessed 
in July 2005, now unavailable. 
44
 A few articles referred to the vision of a Shi‘i state “from Samarra’ to Basra/Fao/Umm Qasr” – a 
notion specific enough to suggest a certain minimum proliferation of the CISI message outside its core 
electorate; see for instance the untitled contribution by Abu Haydar al-Khaz‘ali, 25 May 2004 
(http://www.iraker.dk/maqalat9/112.htm). Another article showing how a writer discovered the CISI 
website and was subsequently moved to get in touch with its supporters is Muhammad Sa‘id al-Khatib, 
“Shi‘at al-‘iraq: al-waqi‘ wa al-tumuh” [The Shi‘is of Iraq: current situation and aspirations], undated, 
circa autumn 2004 (alhalem.net/New10/sheaaaliraq.htm).  For a criticism that does pick up on some of 
the separatist rhetoric, see Wajdi Anwar Mirdan, “Zilzal al-‘iraq al-qadim” [Iraq’s upcoming earth-
quake], 29 June 2004 (http://www.kefaya.org/Translations/040629wamerdan.htm). See also ‘Ali Thu-
wayni, “Fidiraliyyat al-janub … Hulm ‘dawlat sharaqawa’ am fakhkh irani?” [A federal entity for the 
south … The dream of a “state for the sharaqawa” (plural form  
of shuruqi, collective term associated with people from the ‘Amara area) or an Iranian trap?] (posted as 
attachment to the main article at http://www.nasiriyeh.net/Maqalat4/wtahirjune6.htm). 
45
 Davis, Memories of State, pp. 184–188; Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 103–106; Isam al-Khafaji, “State Terror and the Degrada-
tion of Politics”, in Fran Hazelton (ed.), Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy (London: 
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nantal root as the word for “east” and during the twentieth century associated with 
immigrants in Baghdad from (south-eastern) ‘Amara in particular – with the added 
connotation of ancestry from lands “east” and therefore again with possible Persian 
connections. (The etymology here is controversial and other spelling variants like 
shuruki occur, but what is clear is that the interpretation deemed least complimentary 
has been exploited to a maximum by those wishing to denigrate rural southern new-
comers to Baghdad society.) Traditionally, shuruqi was pejoratively assigned by 
Baghdadis to impoverished immigrants living in separate quarters outside the city 
centre, but today there is a growing tendency among Shi‘is to turn this situation on its 
head and to use terms like shuruqi with a sense of pride.46 Importantly, not only does 
the Internet seem to play a role in this, but supporters of separatism and federalism are 
increasingly speaking the same language on the subject – often in combination with 
frontal attacks on Arab nationalism and its perceived proxies like the Arab League 
(“who in the name of nationalism gives distant countries like Mauritania a say in Iraqi 
affairs”) and pan-Arab media including television stations such as al-Jazeera and al-
‘Arabiyya.47 Herein might lie the embryo for new and possibly even anti-Arab rheto-
ric with a potential for taking Shi‘i political discourse into uncharted waters. In fact, 
the first signs of some kind of synthesis in this direction with practical consequences 
are already becoming evident: in June 2005, some participants in the pro-federal 
meetings in the south were beginning to use the term “the Sumerian region” – the sort 
of vocabulary that had already been popular among exiles on the Internet for some 
time.48  
     Another thinkable intersection between the two trends is of more religious but 
equally particularistic colouring. More and more, there are indications that the politi-
cal leadership of some of the leading Shi‘i Islamist parties, especially the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                            
Zed Books, 1994): 29; Ferhad Ibrahim, Konfessionalismus und Politik in der arabischen Welt: Die 
Schiiten im Irak (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1997), pp. 330–332. 
46
 For one example see ‘Ali al-Khafaji, “Inqilab al-mahrumin didda amrika wa-‘umala’iha” [The revolt 
of the deprived against the United States and its agents], 10 August 2004 
(http://www.sotaliraq.com/thenewiraq/article_2004_08_10_4218a7896.html). The writer’s rather 
abrupt turn to a Shi‘i particularistic take on Iraqi geography during the violent summer of 2004 is em-
blematic of the new separatist current: only months earlier, he had contributed an article where he 
claimed that “Syria’s special role in Lebanon” could not in any sense be compared to that of Iran vis-à-
vis Iraq, because Iraq, after all, was the “Land of Mesopotamia” (ma bayna al-nahrayn, or “the land 
between the two rivers”), a great political entity whose unique place in history was not encumbered by 
regional entanglements like those supposedly tying Lebanon to Syria. On the contrary, Iraq had been a 
recognisable historical entity for millennia, with a pedigree which crucially also included Assyria – a 
civilisation associated with the northern reaches of the contemporary state. See “Al-‘iraq li-iran laysa 
ka-lubnan li-suriyya” [Iraq is not to Iran what Lebanon is to Syria], 21 June 2004 
(http://www.alhalem.net/New5/iraqtoiran.htm). Another example involves reinterpretations of the con-
troversial Zanj revolt (carried out by African slaves in the Basra area against their landlords and the 
Abbasids in the ninth century) – an episode which acquired a certain stigma in pro-regime historiogra-
phy during the Ba‘th era (see Davis, Memories of State, pp. 205–207), but one which is increasingly 
treated as a reservoir of symbolic power by southern regionalists; see for instance al-Shatri, “Li-kay la 
nazalla …”  
47
 For one example of such criticism of “Arab chauvinism”, see As‘ad Rashid, “Fakhkh yunsabu li-
shi‘at al-iraq ismuhu ‘hukumat al-wahda al-wataniyya’ ” [A snare set up for the Shi‘is of Iraq, its name 
being “the government of national unity”], 12 April 2005, 
(http://www.shi3at.com/SHI3AT2/april/rashid11.htm). 
48
 “Mu’tamar fi janub al-‘iraq li-insha’ ‘iqlim sumir’ ” [Conference in southern Iraq to set up the Sumer 
Region], al-Hayat, 2 June 2005. For another example of synthesis of pro-federal and separatist ideas, 
see  ‘Ali Al Shaffaf, “Al-naft muqabila al-hukm” [Oil-for-rule (patterned on the “oil-for-food” con-
cept)], 28 June 2005 (http://www.iraqsawad.net/a163.htm), where separatism is more of a threat that 
lurks in the background. 
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Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), are scrapping their traditional and 
long-held anti-sectarian and universalistic approach to federalism and – possibly un-
der strains of the upsurge in anti-Shi‘i terrorist attacks but conceivably perhaps also 
out of office-seeking ambition – have their eyes on all the Shi‘i areas as a combined 
federal unit. This goes against the arrangements of the 2004 Transitional Administra-
tive Law, but a scheme exactly on these lines began to appear in the shape of rumours 
in the summer of 2004 and became manifest at a July 2005 conference in Najaf (held 
under the auspices of organisations close to SCIRI) which formally declared the aim 
of establishing territorial contiguity in “all nine Shi‘i provinces”.49 The theme was 
conspicuously absent from the statements of all the leading ulama assembled for the 
occasion (including those of Ayatollahs Fayyad, Najafi and others considered close to 
the leading Shi‘i cleric, Ayatollah Sistani),50 and many secular Shi‘is are dead set 
against it, fearing Iran-like conditions.51 But on the other hand, these more sectarian 
Shi‘i politicians may find support for their new approach among the separatists in ex-
ile who participate in the Iraqi debate via their computers. Latterly, members of both 
camps have been fraternising for instance in denominating the Shi‘i-dominated parts 
of Iraq by the classical Islamic term “al-Sawad” (also sawad al-‘iraq), thus solidify-
ing CISI’s Internet attempts at creating a discrete vocabulary for a separate Shi‘i po-
litical universe. And it is this new direction within Shi‘i politics which has played a 
leading role in recent attempts at dismantling the “no boundless sectarianism” safety 
clause (53C) in the Transitional Administrative Law (whereby an upper limit of three 
is set for the number of existing governorates allowed to federate into a single entity, 
and on which the project for a small-scale federal region in the south has pinned its 
ambitions) – efforts that may augur the proliferation to the Mesopotamian plains of a 
Balkans-echoing, territory-conscious mindset which in Iraqi politics before 2004 pri-
marily found expression among some politicians in the mountainous north.52 
 
 
Conclusion: Implications for practical politics 
 
The Internet has facilitated the articulation of unorthodox Iraqi Shi‘i ideas about sec-
tarian identity and the modern nation state. As test balloons, the separatist writings of 
                                                 
49
 “Al-bayan al-khitami li-al-mu’tamar al-dusturi al-muwassa‘ li-al-hawza al-‘ilmiyya fi al-najaf al-
ashraf” [Concluding statement of the expanded constitutional conference of the religious institutions in 
Najaf], 8 July 2005. 
50
 Having apparently secured a veto against any legislation that would “contradict Islam” in the new 
constitution, it seemed in August 2005 as if the leading quietist clergy were content to abstain from 
further micro-management of the Iraqi constitutional process, thereby avoiding embroilment in prob-
lematic issues like the question of federalism – where they had initially voiced scepticism. Were this 
tendency to prevail, it would leave the image of an “apolitical” clergy considerably more intervention-
ist than what has been the norm for the top scholars of Najaf over the past century, but still far behind 
the proactive scholars who at the time of the constitutional revolution in Persia (1906) worked to insti-
tutionalise an “Islamic veto” in the new political system that was being projected at the time.  
51
 Muhammad Mahbub, “Al-shi‘a wa-al-dawla” [The Shi‘is and the state], undated, mid-July 2005 
(http://www.iraqsawad.net/a2641.htm). 
52
 The same piece of legislation also singles out Kirkuk and Baghdad as areas excepted from the bar-
gaining over new federal entities. A romantic interpretation might highlight these governorates as pro-
tected zones, quintessentially “Iraqi” nodal points in terms of their multi-ethnic complexity, Mostars 
and Sarajevos that still stand to be saved... But article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law goes 
far in recognising ethno-nationalist approaches to the post-Ba‘th disposal of Iraqi territory, by formally 
enshrining the “disputed” status of entire areas like Kirkuk (instead of for instance dealing with the 
forced displacement crimes of the old regime at the level of individuals and families), and by pegging 
any political settlement to the holding of a census enumeration. 
 16
2004–2005 have radii of action that by far supersede the negligible earlier attempts by 
Iraqi Shi‘is at radically redefining the political-territorial set-up in the area they con-
sider their own. With a readership that comprises Iraqis as far apart as Tokyo and Hel-
sinki, the CISI website has succeeded in sustaining a community of like-minded intel-
lectuals that stood little chance of being even conceived before the age of the Internet. 
It may well put discontented Shi‘is in a position to launch a more concerted attack on 
established positions than anything heretofore seen. The postings on the website also 
clearly demonstrate that there are no epistemological barriers to prevent intellectuals 
with a background from Shi‘i milieux from embarking on wholesale renegotiation of 
themes like the ethnic origin of the Shi‘is or the question of what constitutes their his-
torical core territories. 
     At the same time, the Internet exposes the sharp limitations of the separatist trend 
among the Shi‘is. So far, the separatists have been more in evidence on the Internet 
than in real Iraqi politics, which makes it all the more important that their radical fan-
fares in cyberspace be realistically assessed. In 1927, British intelligence officers be-
came engrossed in a factionalist Shi‘i group who briefly toyed with the idea of creat-
ing a sectarian state in Shi‘i areas south of Baghdad, only to find that this project  (not 
to be confused with the more long-lasting urban, Sunni-led separatist movement in 
Basra in the 1920s)53 evaporated only a year later, mainly as a result of anti-separatist 
pressures from within the community.54 Western analysts prone to advocate separa-
tism for the Shi‘is without ascertaining the actual wishes of that segment of the Iraqi 
community should take particular note of this kind of intra-communal marginality be-
fore they start generalising. As should Arab nationalists, who frequently claim that 
federalism in Iraq in any shape or form is merely a prelude to the partition of Iraq, and 
who have repeatedly accused the Shi‘is of involvement in surreptitious “separatist 
plots” – charges which consistently have been short on hard evidence. The virtue of 
the Internet in this case is that it can help to demystify the monster of Shi‘i separa-
tism: by mid-2005 the Iraqi Shi‘i current in favour of complete separation from the 
Sunnis was highly fragmented and to a large extent still in exile, whereas the main 
Shi‘i political parties paid scant attention to the secessionist message propagated on 
the Internet and continued to work with various models for reconstituting Iraq as a 
decentralised or federal state.  
     This has implications for real-world politics and the ongoing debate over a new 
Iraqi constitution. The support among Shi‘is for Iraqi unity even in the context of a 
series of horrific and blatantly sectarian acts of terrorism against the community since 
2004 is impressive. It suggests a robust willingness to maintain the current exterior 
outlook of the Iraqi state, provided certain shifts to its internal arrangements can be 
implemented. If the Shi‘is on their part could abandon some of their maximalist de-
mands as regards an overall Islamic framework for the entire Iraqi state (and if they 
could also agree internally on a common approach to the contested concept of “decen-
tralisation”),55 it seems probable that a solution with federal components should be 
viable and also capable of keeping separatist initiatives in check.56 Today, separatism 
is still only a last-resort alternative for the Shi‘is – and a rather suppressed one at that. 
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 See n. 2 above. 
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 Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State, pp. 121–125, 158–159. 
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 For different Shi‘i approaches to concepts such as federalism and decentralisation, see Kian  
Tajbakhsh, “Political decentralization and the creation of local government in Iran”, Social Research, 
vol. 67, no. 2 (2000) and Visser, “Shi‘i Perspectives on a Federal Iraq”. 
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 During the first half of 2005, reports from the constitutional negotiations sometimes conveyed the 
impression that the traditional standard-bearers of secularism among the Iraqis, the Kurds, might be 
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     The most precarious element in the “All-Iraq” coalition among the Shi‘is is the 
population of the extreme south who demand greater local control over oil resources. 
Theirs are claims that clearly arise from a sense of continued marginalisation also in 
the supposedly more democratic and egalitarian post-war Iraq, as well as from frustra-
tion with a Shi‘i leadership dominated by figures from areas further north. However, 
the solution proposed – allocation of a substantial share of the oil income to local au-
thorities – has already caused controversy. This type of arrangement may work well in 
polities where oil accounts for a small portion of the total national economy (as in 
Canada), or where the state with the most resources also champions the process to-
wards greater national unity (as in the case of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emir-
ates). But in systems where more is at stake and where the existing state tradition is 
centralist, such a formula may turn out to be divisive – as has happened in Iraq, where 
there have been strong reactions from regions short on energy resources. There is little 
doubt that any attempt at projecting geological maps onto demographic ones could 
prove positively dangerous in such messy landscapes as those straddling the East 
Baghdad oil field – a giant reservoir that runs underneath Shi‘i-dominated gover-
norates south of Baghdad via Shi‘i and Sunni suburbia of the capital until it reaches 
its northern nib in the subterranean depths of the largely Sunni province of Salah al-
Din, covering an area where keeping the internal peace is difficult enough even with-
out hydrocarbons forming part of the equation. Additionally, oil politics could aggra-
vate internal strife among the Shi‘is themselves, especially if a constitution without 
size limits on federal entities is adopted. Ultimately, this might set the stage for a 
showdown between two competing types of federalism – the “southern” one with its 
civic, non-ethnic framework, and the “Shi‘i” variant with its privileged access to the 
contagious language of sectarianism and as such more reminiscent of political winds 
that shattered the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.57 
     Should regional income quotas on natural resources prove unworkable, a transi-
tional arrangement with some added carrots for the energy-rich regions might perhaps 
form an alternative. After all, in the Basra area the demand for local control of oil has 
so far been linked to a perception of disproportionate southern suffering during the 
years of the Ba‘th; devices like a transitional fund to achieve greater socio-economic 
and developmental regional parity might rectify this without enshrining the oil issue 
as a permanent constitutional bone of contention with the potential for chronic insta-
bility in the future. In this way, it should be possible to enhance the position of the 
south within a five- to ten-year framework, and additional legislation could be passed 
to relocate energy-related ministries and state companies out of Baghdad to create fur-
ther spin-offs for key areas like Kirkuk and the south. For instance, in the case of the 
                                                                                                                                            
prepared to give in to Shi‘i Islamists at the national level by technically acceding to certain demands 
for an overall Islamic framework, on the assumption that they would always be able to maintain de 
facto control in their areas of demographic dominance (or, as seen more recently, by pushing for a 
“self-determination” exit clause in the constitution). Other secular sections of the Iraqi population are 
far more vulnerable to Islamism imposed from above, with only the communists possessing a symbolic 
palisade that seems sturdy enough to form a credible rallying point for resistance. The rest of the secu-
larist Iraqis could easily end up on the sidelines if constitutional innovation is sacrificed in order to 
keep the deadlines laid down in the post-war US–Iraqi agreements on political transition – deadlines 
which Washington quite crudely insisted on when work with the new Iraqi charter reached a critical 
phase in August 2005.  
57
 Basra and the far south of Iraq have certain precedents for producing regionalist factions within the 
larger Iraqi Shi‘i Islamist organisations, as witnessed for instance in the 1980s. See ‘Adil Ra’uf, Hizb 
al-da‘wa al-islamiyya: al-masira wa-al-fikr al-haraki [The Islamic Da‘wa party: experiences and party 
doctrines] (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya wa-al-Buhuth wa-al-Tawthiq, 1999) p. 42, and Ja-
bar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, pp. 257–258. 
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south, a new petroleum-related government complex located somewhere near Nasiri-
yya would boost the economy of that city (whose nearby archaeological sites at Ur 
have long been neglected), and also help Basra (the region’s chief port of entry) as 
well as ‘Amara (the gateway to the marshes, with their great potential as a protected 
area for wildlife and a tourist attraction) – measures ideally suited to help keep at bay 
demands for secession of the kind now being floated on the Internet.  
     Despite the current weakness of the separatist trend among the Shi‘is, develop-
ments in Shi‘i political discourse over the next few months and years will be 
of critical importance to the fate of the Iraqi one-state project. Of particular signifi-
cance is that the flames fanning both separatist chatter in cyberspace backwoods as 
well as manifest federalist initiatives on the ground in Iraq stem largely from a com-
mon source and from shared grievances, despite today’s differences over political 
strategy. If the security situation in Iraq is allowed to deteriorate further or if wide in-
ternal rifts between Shi‘i political elites from different parts of the country should de-
velop, there may come additional Shi‘i defections to the separatist camp. This is an 
alternative for which the community has no historical tradition and little in the way of 
ready-made political doctrine, but one that for the first time in Iraqi history is being 
kept alive due not least to new media and communications technology.  
